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Abstract: We examine the effects of digital access on the prevalence of 
democracy and its diffusion via geographical and trade networks across 152 
countries between 2000 and 2008. Although civil liberties and media freedom 
show a consistently positive relationship with different forms of digital access, 
our dynamic models that allow co-evolution of digital access, democracy and 
trade tie formation suggest that high mobile penetration has a more significant 
impact on civil liberties than Internet access does, and may also increase a 
country’s “susceptibility” to democratic changes in neighboring nations. We 
explore possible drivers of these empirical findings, discussing some social and 
political implications. 
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1. Overview and Motivation 
On January 14th, 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down as the 
president of Tunisia, reacting to a localized series of protests that had begun in the 
central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid four weeks earlier. Over the next ten days, 
thousands of people in neighboring Egypt demanded the resignation of their 
president Hosni Mubarak, an Egyptian Facebook page was set up to coordinate 
protests in Cairo, and there was widespread revolutionary activity in countries that 
included Yemen and Algeria. These protests soon fanned out across the region, 
and by early February, 11,000 Syrians had joined a Facebook page called The 
Syrian Revolution, citizens of Yemen, Jordan, Morocco and Oman were staging 
public rallies, and the government of nearby Kuwait had made key interior 
government changes towards pre-empting demonstrations. The short-term 
culmination of these events was a series of protests at Tahrir Square that was 
covered extensively by the international press and which soon led to resignation 
of Hosni Mubarak on February 11th, 2011, later spawning a civil war in Libya and 
persistent unrest in Yemen.  Regional diffusion of revolution in this way is not 
unprecedented. Many writers have drawn a parallel between this recent “Jasmine 
Revolution” or “Arab Spring” and the Spring of Nations of 1848, which began in 
Sicily in January, became more visible in France in February, then spread through 
much of Europe over the year (Evans and Strandmann, 2000)1.  
A newer and recurring theme associated with the 2011 events in Northern Africa 
has been a focus on the role that information technologies and social media may 
or may not have played in sustaining and diffusing revolutionary activity and 
political change. Press coverage concurrent with the events frequently emphasized 
the enabling role of the Internet, even going so far as to label these “Twitter 
Revolutions” or “Facebook Revolutions”. However, the ex-post and deeper 
analysis has been more cautious in ascribing any causal role to social media 
                                                            
1 These revolutions were largely suppressed by the end of the year and it is 
generally believed that they did not lead to a great deal of reform beyond the 
abolition of serfdom in Austria and Hungary. 
technologies, although pointing to two key aspects of information technologies – 
providing access to information and providing a means for coordination – as 
potential sources of their catalyzing effect on democratic change2.  For example, 
in a prescient Foreign Affairs article in January 2011, Clay Shirky notes that: 
“The safest characterization of recent quantitative attempts to answer the 
question, Do digital tools enhance democracy? is that these tools probably 
do not hurt in the short run and might help in the long run – and that they 
have the most dramatic effects in states where a public sphere already 
constrains the actions of the government. Despite this mixed record, social 
media have become coordinating tools for nearly all of the world's 
political movements, just as most of the world's authoritarian governments 
(and, alarmingly, an increasing number of democratic ones) are trying to 
limit access to it.” (Shirky, 2011) 
Similarly, Fareed Zakaria adopts a more neutral position in summarizing his view 
about how information technologies might affect democratization: 
“It's too simple to say that what happened in Tunisia and Egypt happened 
because of Facebook. But technology — satellite television, computers, 
mobile phones and the Internet — has played a powerful role in 
informing, educating and connecting people in the region. Such advances 
empower individuals and disempower the state. In the old days, 
information technology favored those in power, because it was one-to-
many. That's why revolutionaries tried to take over radio stations in the 
1930s — so they could broadcast information to the masses. Today's 
                                                            
2 This is not the first new technology has been connected to the diffusion of 
revolution; there is also conjecture that while the information transparency 
facilitated by the emergence of newspapers played a role in sustaining the 1848 
Spring of Nations revolution within each country (Zakaria, 2011), there were no 
technologies for coordinating revolutionary activity across the neighboring 
countries (Evans and Strandmann, 2000). 
technologies are all many to many, networks in which everyone is 
connected but no one is in control. That's bad for anyone trying to 
suppress information.” (Zakaria, 2011) 
It is indeed too early to assess whether the revolutions in Northern Africa will 
lead to longer-run political reform, or whether information technologies will play 
a pivotal role in sustaining either the activism or any subsequent democratic 
change.  Nevertheless, these events provide timely motivation for the question we 
investigate in this paper: Is access to digital technologies related to the emergence 
of democracy within a country and the diffusion of democracy across countries? 
Our question does not restrict our focus to short-term revolutionary activities 
aimed at radical political change. The emergence of WikiLeaks and the ongoing 
challenges faced by local bloggers in China indicate that the effects that digital 
technologies may have on democracy and freedom are more far-reaching than the 
effect social media might or might not have on fostering revolution; our question 
thus is broader in its scope and timeframe than one that asks, say, whether social 
media technologies foster the emergence and diffusion of social or political 
revolutions.   
We find this question compelling enough to warrant further investigation because 
there is sufficient reason to believe that the adoption of digital technologies could 
lead governments in an anti- democratic direction. For example, Medina (2011) 
documents the attempts by Chilean President Salvador Allende to create an IBM-
based computer system in the early 1970’s to facilitate a more efficient planned 
economy; while this “Project CyberSyn” was only partially successful, there is 
some evidence that it was instrumental in thwarting a 1972 labor strike by 40,000 
truck drivers in Santiago. Although it was common in the early days of the 
popular Internet to assert that the decentralized and open IP technologies it was 
based on would render it useless as a technology for regulating behavior, Lessig 
(2006) makes a compelling counter-argument in his discussion about architectures 
of control.  To quote: 
“I describe the changes that could – and are – pushing the Net from the 
unregulable space it was, to the perfectly regulable space it could be. 
These changes are not being architected by government. They are not the 
product of some 1984-inspired conspiracy; they are the consequences of 
changes made for purely pragmatic, commercial ends.” (Lessig, 2006, 
p.38) 
In a related vein, Nissenbaum (1998) argues that information technologies are 
altering the meaning of what is public information, which makes current notions 
of the scope of privacy increasingly limited, and consequently limits the extent to 
which individuals may use privacy to “sustain power, liberty, and autonomy 
against potentially overwhelming forces of government.”  Ironically, a trend of 
digital convergence over the last decade may exacerbate the potential use of the 
Internet as a technology of control; as citizens of a country become more reliant 
on a single network for accessing textual information/news, video information, as 
well as for person-to-person voice and data communication, the potential for 
governments to exercise (anti-democratic) control through digital technologies 
grows3.  
Before providing evidence that addresses our question empirically, we will (1) 
make the idea of “democracy” more precise, (2) discuss the connection between 
technological progress, different kinds of “digital access” and the emergence of 
democracy, and (3) briefly mention the different networks over which such 
diffusion, if it exists, might occur.  
                                                            
3 This does not have to take the form of a complete Burma or Egypt-style Internet 
shutdown. Rather, control of the kind wherein only specific kinds of Web-based 
information are available to its citizens might be equally detrimental to 
democracy. In a future where Internet-based news is the only available news, this 
form of control can be quite powerful, and since Web browsing creating the 
illusion of user control and choice, even more so. 
First, although the term is generally associated with direct participation, political 
equality and popular sovereignty, there are a number of different conceptions of 
“democracy”. In arguing against the use of definitions of democracy based on 
outcomes and in favor of definitions based on how the government is chosen and 
functions, O’Loughlin and his co-authors suggest that economic freedoms and 
political freedoms must be treated as distinct, and when confounding a definition 
of democracy with its desired outcomes, one risks losing analytical leverage. 
Similarly, Zakaria (1997) notes that to define democracy as meaning “‘a good 
government’ renders it analytically useless.” These issues notwithstanding, our 
objective in this paper is to study the effects of networks and digital access on 
democracy itself, rather than the effect of democratic institutions on their intended 
outcomes, and we therefore lean towards measures that are both procedural and 
substantive definitions. This is consistent with the thinking of Zakaria (1997) who 
argues that defining democracy merely based on how a country chooses its 
government may be too narrow and citing the emergence of a number of “illiberal 
democracies”, countries whose governments might be chosen using democratic 
procedures, but whose citizens lack basic liberties of speech, assembly and 
religion. A similar contrast is drawn by Diamond (2008) between “thick” and 
“thin” democracies. This distinction between political rights and civil liberties 
motivates including some measure of both in assessing the “level” of democracy 
in a country. We are particularly interested in changes in civil liberties that relate 
to freedom of expression, the right to associate freely, and personal autonomy, 
since intuitively, these are most likely to be altered directly by changes in 
citizens’ digital access. We also consider a third measure of democracy, namely 
media freedom, since it is possible that the path via which digital access leads to a 
change in civil liberties or political rights is through its impact on freedom of the 
media; indeed, there is a long-standing belief that a free press is an essential pre-
cursor to a strong democracy (McChensky and Nichols, 2009).  
Next, there is a healthy history of conjecture about the connection between 
technological progress and the emergence of democracy. As Langdon Winner 
points out: 
“An eagerness to interpret technical artifacts in political language is by no 
means the exclusive property of large-scale, high-technology systems. A 
long lineage of boosters has insisted that the biggest and best that science 
and industry made available were the best guarantees of democracy, 
freedom and social justice. The factory system, automobile, telephone, 
radio, television, space program, and of course nuclear power have all at 
one time or another been described as democratizing, liberating forces.” 
(Winner, 1986) 
Glancing through recent examples suggests that while the connection between 
digital access and democracy could be real, it is unlikely to conform to a return to 
an Athenian style of democracy with direct participation by citizens (Giridharadas 
2009) and the elimination of the need for representative government, and more 
likely to resemble the transparency and coordination effects visible during the 
events in Northern Africa in 2011. For example, Goldstein (2007) documents the 
use of mobile ‘phones and web-based discussion boards in fostering the Orange 
Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine. Faris and Etling (2008) discuss the how the 
Burmese government shut down the Internet in their country for two weeks 
towards quashing the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”. In trying to mirror this strategy 
partially, the Egyptian government made numerous attempts to shut down 
protestor communications technology in 2011, blocking Twitter and mobile usage 
on January 25th, blocking Facebook, shutting down Blackberry and cutting 
network access at Tahrir Square on January 26th, and eventually shutting down all 
Internet services on January 27th.  
The “revolutions” that digital access might affect need not be aimed at radical 
political change; similar examples have conjectured the role played by 
decentralized digital technology in changing the course of elections in South 
Korea in 2002 and the United States in 2008. Furthermore, as argued by Zhou, 
Wellman and Yu, it seems important to look beyond the explicit effects that social 
media may or may not have on events like the resignation of Mubarak; implicit 
effects like fostering “networked individualism” may actually have a greater 
effect on longer-run and more permanent democratic change (Zhou et al. 2011).  
Two recurring themes in each of these (and earlier) examples of digital 
democratization are that the technology in question played one or both of two 
roles: enabling greater information access or transparency, and facilitating the 
coordination of activities between geographically dispersed citizens4. The most 
striking recent example of information technology’s effect on government 
information transparency can be found by examining the myriad documents that 
have been made available by Julian Assange’s WikiLeaks, which is made possible 
by a network of servers on the (traditional) Internet. A related kind of 
transparency is facilitated by the network of mobile phone users on the Usha Hidi 
platform, which has been instrumental in documenting ethnic violence in Kenya 
and making this information more accessible.  
Access to information and the ability to coordinate are familiar as the underlying 
transformative effects of information technologies on organizations and markets 
(Gurbaxani and Whang 1991). While we do not attempt to parse these effects 
separately in our analysis, they motivate us to adopt a broader definition of 
“digital access” to include not just Internet access but access to other technologies 
for information access and coordination, including landline telephones and mobile 
‘phones. The inclusion of the latter is further motivated by recognizing that for a 
vast majority of the industrializing world, the mobile Internet will be the only 
Internet, and mobile ‘phone adoption is a precursor to broader digital access.  A 
series of prior studies that have examined the connection between digital access 
and the emergence of democracy often include both information and 
communications technologies: for recent examples, see Grolshek (2010) or 
Howard (2010) and the references they cite.  
                                                            
4 Faris and Etling (2008) provide an excellent and detailed analysis of the 
different ways in which digital access might contribute both positively and 
negatively to democracy. 
Finally, there are a number of ways in which different countries are linked to one 
another and it is conceivable that any one of these networks of links could serve 
as a long-run conduit for the forces of democracy. Our opening example clearly 
motivates the role a geographic network might play as a channel of this kind. A 
similar basis for diffusion was used by O’Loughlin et al. (1998) who find 
evidence of both temporal and spatial clustering of democracy during the period 
1946-1994.  Geographic proximity also plays a role in how Internet technologies 
might alter access to information: Blum and Goldfarb provide quantitative 
evidence of this linkage, showing that for taste-dependent digital content, a 1% 
increase in the physical distance of the country a web site is based in from the 
country a user resides in reduces website visits by 3.25%.  This connection 
notwithstanding, since the diffusion of democracy across countries, if it occurs, 
will be driven largely by the spread of ideas and information, it is likely that non-
geographic networks that facilitate this spread will play an equally important role. 
A proxy we use for this kind of “idea” network is a network based on trade flows 
between countries, which while clearly not mirroring the flow of information or 
ideology, serves as a reasonable approximation.  
 
2. Data 
Our analysis uses a panel comprising data about annual measures of democracy, 
digital access, trade flows, political institutions, and economic development which 
we construct for 152 countries between 2000 and 2008. The countries we exclude 
did not report trade data or digital access data for at least one year during the 
analysis period. 
Democracy. Our three primary measures of democracy are political rights 
(PoliticalRights), civil liberties (CivilLiberties) and media freedom 
(MediaFreedom), all of which are obtained from Freedom House 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org), an independent watchdog organization that 
specializes in the analysis of the components of freedom.  
  
Figure 2: The evolution of civil liberties 2000-2008. 
The measures of civil liberties and political rights are obtained from their annual 
“Freedom in the World” reports from 2000 to 2008.  Freedom House rates 
countries based on a 25-question survey, of which 10 are about political rights and 
15 are about civil liberties. The questions contributing to their measures of 
political rights are designed to assess the electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and the functioning of government. The civil liberties questions 
assess freedom of expression, rule of law, right to associate freely, and personal 
autonomy.  The survey yields a score between 0 and 40 for political rights and a 
score between 0 and 60 for civil liberties, which are then converted to normalized 
scores on a 7-point scale, with countries with the highest civil liberties or political 
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rights receiving a 7 as their respective rating5. A summary of the evolution of 
average assessed civil liberties is provided in Figure 2. Our measure of media 
freedom is obtained from Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press Index 
which gauges the autonomy of the press across the world. The composite index is 
created by surveying overseas correspondents and staff members regarding the 
legal, political, and economic environment and its influence on media content.  
Digital Access. Our primary measures of digital access—mobile phone 
subscribers and Internet subscribers—were gathered from the World 
Telecommunications and ICT Indicators database of the International 
Telecommunication Union, a United Nations agency (http://www/.itu.int). The 
variables we use are:   
 MobileDensity. The number of subscribers to portable mobile telephone 
service divided by the de facto population (defined below), expressed as a 
percentage between 0 and 100. Since subscribers may not be isolated precisely 
in the ITU data, this number is somewhere between the number of active 
mobile phone connections and the number of people who own one or more 
mobile phones.  
 InternetDensity. The number of Internet subscribers with fixed access to the 
Internet divided by the de facto population, expressed as a percentage between 
0 and 100. This measure includes dial-up, broadband, cable modem, DSL, and 
any other service provider. Mobile data subscriptions are not included in this 
measure. 
 PhoneDensity: The number subscribers to wireline telephone service divided 
by the de facto population, expressed as a percentage between 0 and 100. 
Mobile and satellite telephone connections are not included in this measure.  
A summary of the evolution of these three primary measures of digital access is 
provided in Figure 3.  
                                                            
5 Further details and a complete list of these questions for 2010 is available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=362&year=2010  
  
 
Figure 3: Three measures of digital access, 2000-2008. 
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In some of the analysis that follows, we use the derived binary variables 
InternetThreshold and MobileThreshold. InternetThreshold takes the value 1 if the 
country’s InternetDensity is larger than 50 (that is, if more than half the country’s 
population has Internet access), and MobileThreshold takes the value 1 if the 
country’s MobileDensity is above 75 (that is, if there are at least 75 mobile 
subscribers for each 100 people).  
Network Variables. We construct the following networks for each year 2000-
2008. 
 Geographic Network: A graph in which each country is represented by a node, 
and a shared land border between two countries is represented as an edge 
between their corresponding nodes. We assembled and cross-checked inter-
country political borders from a variety of sources, including the CIA World 
Factbook.  
 Trade Network: A graph in which each country is represented by a node, and 
two nodes A and B are connected by a directed edge from A to B if Country A 
was one of the top exporters to Country B. Since different countries have 
different import volumes, we define country A as a top exporter to country B 
if A’s level of export flows are at least 5% of the level of export flows of the 
country that exports the most to country B.  Export and import dollar volumes 
are obtained using the commodities export flows data from the United Nations 
Comtrade database (http://comtrade.un.org).  
The two networks for the year 2000 are illustrated in Figure 4. 
For each network, we construct five different network variables for each country: 
NeighborCivilLiberties, NeighborPoliticalRights, NeighborMediaFreedom, 
NeighborMobileDensity and NeighborInternetDensity. For example, for the 
geographic network, NeighborCivilLiberties for country A is the average value of 
CivilLiberties for each country that shares a political border with country A. The 
other four variables are defined analogously.  
 Figure 4: Illustrates the geographic network (left) and the trade network (right) in 
the year 2000. The red nodes denote countries classified as “not free”, the green 
nodes are countries that are “partially free”, and the blue nodes are countries that 
are “free”. 
Similarly, for the directed trade network, NeighborCivilLiberties for country A is 
the average value of CivilLiberties for all countries who are top exporters to 
country A (and whose nodes therefore have a directed edge in the trade network 
that terminates at the node corresponding to country A).   
Control variables. We use a number of control variables that we believe might 
alternatively explain temporal and cross-country variations in the specific 
measures of digital access and democracy we have described above. These 
include measures of political structure as well as measures of economic 
development. Our two controls for political structure are: 
 Checks: an approximate measure of the balance of power within a 
government. Checks is incremented by one for each chamber in the legislature 
and by one for every party active in the government which has an ideological 
center closer to the main opposition than to the executive’s party. For 
autocratic countries, Checks equals one. This variable was obtained from the 
World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions (http://econ.worldbank.org).  
 
Variable 
2000-2008 2000 2008 
Average SD Average SD Average SD 
MobileDensity 39.35 39.48 15.40 22.41 73.51 44.61 
InternetDensity 16.43 21.51 7.26 12.24 26.14 25.87 
PhoneDensity 18.43 18.84 18.24 20.18 18.43 17.47 
Checks 2.84 1.61 2.85 1.53 2.94 1.85 
MaleLaborForce  75.83 10.18 76.26 10.22 75.64 10.08 
LifeExpectancy 67.23 10.60 66.26 10.53 68.30 10.44 
UrbanPopulationRatio 54.20 23.20 52.92 23.50 55.53 22.99 
RuralPopulationRatio 45.80 23.20 47.08 23.50 44.47 22.99 
TotalPopulation (log) 15.90 1.75 15.84 1.76 15.96 1.76 
Population15 62.02 6.57 60.74 6.46 63.22 6.61 
PopulationGrowth 1.47 1.29 1.50 1.36 1.48 1.34 
FixedBroadbandInternet 2.93 6.76 0.18 0.82 6.99 11.01 
GDP 8854 14295 6146 9462 13340 20040 
Geographic Network       
NeighborCivilLiberties 3.63 2.06 3.43 1.97 3.73 2.09 
NeighborPoliticalRights 3.58 2.23 3.52 2.25 3.55 2.20 
NeighborMediaFreedom 40.99 25.21 41.10 25.72 39.91 24.52 
NeighborMobileDensity  31.77 33.76 11.68 17.09 61.65 41.35 
NeighborInternetDensity 12.44 16.85 5.10 8.38 20.97 21.37 
NeighborGDP 6610 10938 4561 7284 10070 15046 
Trade Network       
NeighborCivilLiberties 4.77 2.22 4.73 2.01 4.21 2.60 
NeighborPoliticalRights 4.86 2.28 5.11 2.18 4.20 2.60 
NeighborMediaFreedom 56.84 26.76 60.28 25.82 48.20 29.99 
NeighborMobileDensity  55.63 32.43 35.09 17.28 73.38 45.51 
NeighborInternetDensity 30.92 18.40 18.54 9.60 37.04 24.48 
NeighborGDP 18200 10633 14880 7554 21250 14555 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 ElectoralDemocracy: A binary variable which is coded as 1 if the country had 
an electoral democracy as their government form for the corresponding year.  
This variable was obtained from Freedom House.  
Each of our controls for economic development was obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators database (http://econ.worldbank.org). 
They are:  
 MaleLaborForce: The proportion males older than 15 in the population who 
provide labor during the year. 
 LifeExpectancy: the number of years that a newborn infant is expected to 
survive if the mortality rates remain constant. 
 UrbanPopulationRatio: the ratio of the population living in urban areas as 
classified by national statistical offices.  
 RuralPopulationRatio: the ratio of the population living in rural areas as 
classified by national statistical offices.  
 TotalPopulation: the mid-year estimate of the number of people residing in the 
country’s borders, regardless of legal status or citizenship. This de facto 
population definition excludes refugees who have not permanently settled in 
their asylum country. 
 Population15-64: the percentage of the total population between the ages of 
15 and 64, irrespective of citizenship status. 
 PopulationGrowth: the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from 
the previous year to the current year, expressed as a percentage  
 FixedBroadbandInternet: the number of broadband subscribers with a digital 
subscriber line, cable modem, or other high-speed technology divided by the 
de-facto population 
 
3. Digital Access, Democracy and Diffusion 
Our initial analysis uses panel data methods (Woolridge, 2002) to provide an 
assessment of the relationship between democracy, digital access and our two 
networks of countries. We have chosen to use CivilLiberties as the dependent 
variable across the entire analysis of this section. This is based on our belief that 
civil liberties are likely to be affected more rapidly by changes in digital access 
than political rights which require more substantive structural changes in the way 
government is organized. (In the language of Faris and Etling 2008, civil liberties 
are altered more by changes in “vertical processes” that digital technologies have 
a more natural impact on, while changes in political rights depend more on 
corresponding changes in “horizontal processes”.) Our empirical design assesses 
the direct impact of digital access and neighbor characteristics on civil liberties; 
additionally, as discussed briefly in an earlier section, we include media freedom 
as an independent variable since it is possible that the changes induced by digital 
access are mediated by changes in media freedom.  We have estimated models 
that include PoliticalRights as a control variable and those which do not, with no 
directionally significant differences in any of the coefficient values.  Retaining 
both these alternative measures of democracy in each of our specifications 
ensures that we are not incorrectly ascribing a change in civil liberties to a change 
in digital access when in fact the former may have been caused by a change in one 
of these other related measures of political structure or freedom.  
We control for unobserved heterogeneity in our data by grouping the panel data 
by continent and by country (as indicated under “grouping” in Table 2). This 
grouping is based on our conjecture that there may be unobserved causes for the 
variation in democracy across continents, as well as admitting the possibility that 
the nature of the effects of digital access on civil liberties may vary across 
different regions of the world. Consequently, we report on estimates that use fixed 
effects, as well as those which use random effects and random coefficients to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity. More precisely, each of our mixed model 
specifications places a random coefficient on the Checks control variable, 
specifies a random intercept, and random effects that are grouped hierarchically 
by continent and then by country. Each of our fixed effects specifications groups 
the data by continent and by country. Further details on these methods and of our 
specific implementation of them are available in Woolridge (2002) and Pinheiro 
et al. (2011).  
Table 2 summarizes the results of a subset of our panel data analysis. A number of 
interesting observations emerge from this analysis. As illustrated by the first two 
rows of Table 2, civil liberties are positively associated with both political rights 
and media freedom, and this relationship is significant for every model 
specification we have tried. More importantly, most of our model specifications 
find a positive relationship between changes in civil liberties and changes in each 
of our three measures of digital access: the density of Internet users, the density of 
mobile ‘phone users, and the density of traditional (wireline) phone users.   
 Table 2: Panel data analysis results 
   Dependent Variable is Civil Liberties  
 Mixed Model Fixed Effect Mixed Model Fixed Effects Mixed Model Fixed Effect Mixed Model Fixed Effect 
Effects Checks Within Checks Within Checks Within Checks Within 
Grouping Continent/Country Country Continent/Country Country Continent/Country Country Continent/Country Country 
Political Rights  0.3902 (0.0211)*** 
0.2829  
(0.0224)*** 
 0.3914 
(0.0211)*** 
0.2856   
(0.0225)*** 
0.3854 
(0.0212)*** 
0.2876 
(0.0224)*** 
 0.3918 
(0.0209)*** 
 0.2884 
(0.0225)*** 
Media Freedom  0.0162 (0.0016)*** 
0.0121  
(0.0018)*** 
 0.0161 
(0.0016)*** 
0.0122  
(0.0018)*** 
0.0164 
(0.0016)*** 
0.0118 
(0.0018)*** 
 0.01667 
(0.0016)*** 
 0.0125  
(0.0018)*** 
Internet Density  0.0072 (0.0027)*** 
 0.0069  
(0.0024)*** 
 0.0048 
(0.00248)* 
0.0047 
(0.0024)* 
0.0065 
(0.0028)** 
0.0054 
(0.0025)** 
 0.0055 
(0.0027)** 
 0.0064 
(0.0024)*** 
Internet Threshold  0.6327 (0.2894)** 
 1.0359  
(0.2538)*** 
-0.0458 
(0.1042) 
-0.0484  
(0.1057) 
0.5888 
(0.3126)* 
1.0870 
(0.2822)*** 
 0.6960 
(0.3574)* 
 0.9261 
(0.3631)** 
Mobile  Density  0.0025 (0.0010)** 
-0.0010  
(0.0010) 
0.0024 
(0.0009)*** 
0.0010 
(0.0009) 
0.0021 
(0.0011)* 
-0.0009 
(0.0010) 
 0.0012  
(0.0011) 
-0.0011 
(0.0010) 
Mobile Threshold  0.1743 (0.1425) 
-0.1939   
(0.1190) 
-0.0807 
(0.0697) 
-0.1019  
(0.0640) 
0.0858 
(0.1548) 
-0.2888 
(0.1344)** 
 0.0383)    
(0.1779) 
-0.2913 
(0.1618)* 
Phone Density  0.0075 (0.0033)** 
 0.0056  
(0.0039) 
0.0093 
(0.0032)** 
0.0087 
(0.0038)** 
0.0089 
(0.0034)*** 
0.0059 
(0.0039) 
 0.0101 
(0.0033)*** 
 0.0059 
(0.0039) 
Internet Threshold* 
Internet  Density 
-0.0115  
(0.0052)** 
-0.0189  
(0.0043)*** N/A N/A 
-0.0110  
(0.0053)** 
-0.0190 
(0.0044)*** 
-0.0129 
(0.0052)** 
-0.0196 
(0.0044)*** 
Mobile Threshold * 
Mobile  Density 
-0.0020 
(0.0018) 
 0.0032 
(0.0014)*** N/A N/A 
-0.0017 
(0.0018) 
0.0026 
(0.0015)* 
-0.0006 
(0.0018) 
 0.0034 
(0.0015)** 
Network  None None Geographic Geographic Geographic Geographic Trade Trade 
Internet Threshold*   
NeighborCivilLiberties N/A N/A 
0.0106 
(0.0185) 
0.0067  
(0.0178) 
 0.0024 
(0.0196) 
-0.0090 
(0.0193) 
 0.0031 
(0.0437) 
 0.0252 
(0.0466) 
Mobile Threshold*  
NeighborCivilLiberties N/A N/A 
0.0254 
(0.0146)* 
0.0456  
(0.0131)*** 
 0.0153 
(0.0154) 
 0.0397 
(0.0146)*** 
 0.0056 
(0.0178) 
 0.0159 
(0.0189) 
NeighborCivilLiberties N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.1092 (0.0432)** 
 0.0407 
(0.0490) 
 0.2592 
(0.0549)*** 
 0.1139 
(0.0664)* 
NeighborPoliticalRights N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.0091  (0.0377) 
 0.0183 
(0.0405) 
-0.0669   
(0.0566) 
-0.0101 
(0.0682) 
NeighborInternetDensity N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.0015 (0.0035) 
 0.0006 
(0.0031) 
 0.0003 
(0.0028) 
-0.0019 
(0.0034) 
NeighborMobileDensity N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.0000 (0.0000) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000002 
0.0000003 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
NeighborMediaFreedom  N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.0042  (0.0028) 
 0.0038 
(0.0034) 
-0.0173 
(0.0045)*** 
-0.0119 
(0.0052)** 
Development and 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notice that this positive relationship between digital access and democracy is 
significant after accounting for the two related measures of democracy (political 
rights and media freedom), both political structure variables (electoral democracy 
and checks), and controlling for changes in all 8 of the measures of economic 
development discussed in Section 2 (GDP, labor participation, fraction of urban 
population and so on) that might be simultaneously causing changes in both 
digital access and civil liberties. We restrict our interpretation of these coefficients 
to their signs, while noting that their magnitudes are in a range that makes their 
impact noticeable. There is also some evidence that this effect is more 
pronounced for countries with a lower base level of Internet access density (based 
on the fact that the InternetThreshold variable interacted with the InternetDensity 
variable has a positive and significant coefficient); interestingly, we did not find 
evidence of a similar effect for mobile access density.     
We also find that a country’s level of civil liberties are positively related to the 
level of civil liberties of its neighbors, both in the trade network as well as in the 
geographic network. This evidence is consistent with a theory that civil liberties 
diffuse across connected countries. Additionally, we find no evidence that a 
country’s civil liberties are associated with other measures of its neighbors’ 
digital access or levels of democracy. Furthermore, interacting both our digital 
access threshold variables with the civil liberties network variables indicates that 
this diffusion effect may be more pronounced for countries that have a high level 
of mobile access. This is striking because it provides the first evidence that a form 
of digital access, one that is especially dominant and growing in the 
industrializing world, may amplify these spillovers in democracy across countries. 
While we see a similar (albeit smaller) positive amplification effect for traditional 
Internet access, it is not statistically significant. These empirical results are 
consistent with a theory that digital access makes a country’s citizens more aware 
of changes in the countries that they are politically and economically connected 
to, and perhaps this awareness translates to activities by these citizens that make 
the diffusion of these changes more likely. An alternative explanation is that 
higher levels of digital access induce a change in citizens (for example, a greater 
level of “networked individualism”, or a greater ability to coordinate actions) 
which in turn may lead to a greater propensity to react to changes they become 
aware of via non-digital information channels.  
There is a possibility that it may take a few years of sustained high levels of 
digital access before one observes changes in civil liberties, which would suggest 
the possibility that digital access has a lagged effect of on civil liberties. We 
explored this possibility empirically by estimating and analyzing a number of 
dynamic panel models. The results are quite sensitive to the lag structure we 
impose, and these dynamic panel models are perhaps not best suited for 
longitudinal network data in which the network changes over time. Consequently, 
we instead adopt a more structured dynamic network analysis which we describe 
in our following section.  
 
4. The Co-Evolution of Democracy, Trade Networks and Digital Access 
While our results thus far suggest a persistent relationship between digital access 
and democracy, as well as suggesting the possibility that there are spillovers in 
democracy across connected countries that are amplified by digital access, there 
may be possible alternative explanations for our findings. For example, rather 
than being induced by changes in digital access, higher levels of civil liberties 
may cause individuals to seek greater digital access. It is also possible that 
countries simply form trade ties with higher export and import flows with others 
whose civil liberties are similar to theirs, for example, in response to their citizens 
not wanting to trade with countries with poor human rights records.  Thus, 
changes in civil liberties may cause change in trade ties, rather than the ties 
inducing a diffusion of the changes in liberties.  
It is well documented that when considering changes in behaviors across 
networked individuals, one should consider the possibility of the co-evolution of 
these individuals and their networks: changes in the network may cause changes 
in behaviors, which in turn may induce further changes in individual behavior 
(Lazer, 2001). A similar dynamic is possible with countries and their levels of 
democracy: information flows via trade networks may induce changes in political 
rights or civil liberties, and these changes may in turn cause a reconfiguration of 
the network of trading partners. It could also be that nodes with similar levels of 
democracy choose to form ties with each other. Put differently, the trade network 
of countries may display assortative mixing in democracy levels due to 
“homophily”, selection or actual influence-based diffusion.    
There are a number of possible approaches that can partially identify and 
distinguish between these different effects from our longitudinal data sets of 
networks and behaviors. We have chosen to base our dynamic empirical analysis 
on the stochastic actor-oriented model of Snijders et al. (2010). While we 
considered using the matched sample framework of Aral et al. (2009), it is better 
suited for larger networks where node homophily rather than new tie formation is 
the alternative explanation for influence-based diffusion. In contrast, the SIENA 
framework lends itself more naturally to our setting of continuous co-evolution of 
network ties and node “behaviors” in a relatively small network.   
The model underlying SIENA decomposes the evolution of the system into two 
related processes that unfold in parallel over time: the evolution of the trade 
network and the evolution of associated “behaviors” and “covariates”: digital 
access, democracy and the political/economic development controls. It is assumed 
that the “behaviors” (which are our variables of interest) and the network may 
change at any instant in continuous time, although we, the researchers, only 
observe the state of the network at discrete time intervals; the remaining 
“covariates” change only at those time instants that the network is observed. 
There is a rate associated with each behavior and with the network in each time 
period (between each observation), which captures the overall propensity of 
changes in the network/behavior during that period.  
For computational reasons, we estimate this model using data from three (rather 
than all nine) time periods: 2000, 2004 and 2008, and we restrict our attention to 
the evolution of three behaviors: Political Rights, Civil Liberties and Media 
Freedom. Furthermore, in the model whose estimation we report on, we use the 
following covariates: Mobile Threshold, Internet Threshold (our two primary 
digital access variables), GDP (included as the most important control variable) 
and Phone Density (included since it consistently had a positive relationship with 
each of the measures of democracy in the panel data analyses).    
During the period 2000-2004 (or alternatively, 2004-2008), each node A of the 
trade network is modeled as evolving a function of three network characteristics: 
 OutDegree, the number of existing countries to which country A is a top 
exporter, which reflects an expectation that forming  new trade ties is 
inherently costly and there is a limit on the number of countries to which one 
can export sufficiently high volumes to be a top exporter.  
 Reciprocity, whether each potential neighbor is a top exporter to country A, 
which reflects an expectation that on average, high volume trade ties tend to 
be reciprocal.  
 Transitive triplets, which admits the possibility that if A is a top exporter to B 
and B is a top exporter to C, this could affect the propensity of A to be a top 
exporter to C.  
In addition, the network is modeled as evolving as a function of each of the three 
behaviors (the measures of democracy), the two primary measures of digital 
access, and GDP. The three kinds of effects that these node characteristics are 
specified as possibly having on trade tie formation are ego (the level of 
democracy or digital access can affect the propensity of a country to form top 
exporter ties), alter (the level of democracy or digital access can affect the 
propensity of a country to be the recipient of exports), and similarity (a country 
may have a higher propensity to form export ties with other countries which have 
a similar level of democracy or comparable levels of digital access).  
  
Table 3(a): The co-evolution of digital access, trading ties and democracy 
Network Formation 
  Variable  Estimate Standard Error  T‐ratio
  Rate period 1  6.6637 0.3271  20.37
  Rate period 2  8.4256 0.3926  21.46
  Outdegree  ‐2.7125 0.0559  ‐48.52
  Reciprocity  0.7249 0.089  8.14
  Transitive triplets  0.1622 0.0061  26.59
  Political Rights alter  0.0939 0.0703  1.34
  Political Rights ego  ‐0.0413 0.0619  ‐0.67
  Political Rights similarity  0.0898 0.3571  0.25
  Civil Liberties alter  ‐0.0884 0.0975  ‐0.91
  Civil Liberties ego  0.162 0.0983  1.65
  Civil Liberties similarity  ‐0.4125 0.4934  ‐0.84
  Media Freedom alter  ‐0.0122 0.0043  ‐2.84
  Media Freedom ego  ‐0.0036 0.0046  ‐0.78
  Media Freedom similarity  0.9026 0.3605  2.50
  Internet Threshold alter  0.0374 0.1458  0.26
  Internet Threshold ego  0.1628 0.1638  0.99
  Internet Threshold similarity  0.1692 0.1341  1.26
  GDP alter  0 31.607  0.00
  GDP ego  0 31.607  0.00
  GDP similarity  0.5359 0.3183  1.68
  Mobile Threshold alter  ‐0.3657 0.136  ‐2.69
  MobileThreshold ego  ‐0.5578 0.1299  ‐4.29
  Mobile Threshold similarity  ‐0.1699 0.0988  ‐1.72
     
Political Rights 
  Variable  Estimate  Standard Error  T‐Ratio
  Rate period 1  1.2054 0.2983  4.04
  Rate period 2   0.6652 0.2355  2.82
  Linear  0.3472 0.243  1.43
  Quadratic  ‐0.5688 0.328  ‐1.73
  Effect from Civil Liberties  1.699 0.9803  1.73
  Effect from Internet 
Threshold  
‐4.8645 5.6043  ‐0.87
  Effect from Mobile Threshold  ‐0.1036 2.7581  ‐0.04
  Effect from Phone Density  0.0197 0.0209  0.94
   
Table 3(b): The co-evolution of digital access, trading ties and democracy, contd. 
Civil Liberties 
  Variable  Estimate Standard Error  T‐Ratio
  Rate period 1  1.2021 0.2353  5.11
  Rate period 2  0.6294 0.1701  3.70
  Linear  1.4247 0.4069  3.50
  Quadratic  ‐1.3226 0.408  ‐3.24
  Effect from Political Rights  1.0516 0.5345  1.97
  Effect from Media Freedom  0.0769 0.0329  2.34
  Effect from Internet Threshold   ‐8.1274 3.0202  ‐2.69
  Effect from Mobile Threshold   8.3045 3.9009  2.13
  Effect from Phone Density  0.0521 0.0276  1.89
     
Media Freedom 
  Variable  Estimate Standard Error  T‐Ratio
  Rate period 1  96.389 11.7697  8.19
  Rate period 2  20.3411 2.968  6.85
  Linear  ‐0.0669 0.0194  ‐3.45
  Quadratic  ‐0.0033 0.001  ‐3.30
  Effect from Civil Liberties  0.1066 0.0316  3.37
  Effect from Internet Threshold   ‐0.9476 0.3559  ‐2.66
  Effect from Mobile Threshold  ‐0.0897 0.102  ‐0.88
  Effect from Phone Density  0 0.0008  0.00
 
 
Correspondingly, the levels of democracy of a country are modeled as evolving as 
follows: based on a basic level effect (which captures the overall preference for 
each measure of democracy), a quadratic effect (which captures the possibility 
that the current level of democracy may affect the future level of democracy), 
effects from other measures of democracy (which captures the possibility that, for 
example, the current level of media freedom might affect the future level of civil 
liberties), and effects from the levels of digital access (for example, a higher level 
of mobile access may cause an increase in the level of civil liberties). 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Tables 3(a) and 3(b). (Further 
discussion of the underlying model is available in Snijders et al., 2010.)  As 
anticipated, countries with a large number of top-export  relationships have a 
lower propensity to form ties (the Outdegree coefficient is negative and 
significant), countries have a higher propensity to form export ties with those they 
import a lot from (the Reciprocity coefficient is positive and significant), and 
trade ties tend to be clustered. Interestingly, we uncover very little evidence of 
selection based on civil liberties or political rights (neither the alter nor ego 
coefficients are significant), or of tie formation based on similarity on level of 
civil liberties or political rights. Further, as illustrated by the coefficients in Table 
3(b), there was a positive increasing tendency for civil liberties (positive Linear 
coefficient) which diminished with an increase in the base level (negative 
Quadratic coefficient). There was also a negative tendency for media freedom, 
reflecting global decrease in this measure over the last decade. 
The most interesting findings from the dynamic analysis were those that 
strengthened and altered the documented relationship between digital access and 
civil liberties. Specifically, mobile access has a strong positive effect on civil 
liberties in the 2000-2008 time period, even after accounting for all the other 
selection and reverse causation effects we have controlled for. This is consistent 
with a conjecture that mobile access improves a citizenry’s ability to exchange 
information and coordinate activities in a manner that results in greater levels of 
liberty. In a sense, mobile technology plays a greater role in facilitating 
coordination of the kind described by Michael Chwe (2003), which, rather than 
transmitting new information about a government and its functioning, or creating 
greater parliamentary/ideological transparency, simply facilitates the “common 
knowledge” that is necessary to counter pluralistic ignorance and lead to 
collective action.  
Strikingly, “traditional” wireline Internet density has a corresponding negative 
effect on both political rights. A possible explanation for this finding is that after 
accounting for other effects, the net effect of a sufficiently high increase in 
traditional Internet access (one that causes the country to cross the 50% density 
threshold) is one of increased control rather than increased freedom; this is 
consistent with the possibility that as the Internet becomes the dominant channel 
of information access, the ability of a government to leverage this technology to 
mediate information transparency grows. Perhaps the countries that have recently 
crossed this threshold in the last decade are those which were especially 
susceptible to this form of control.  
There are many possible explanations for the negative coefficients of Mobile 
Threshold alter and ego. Intuitively, their values suggest that countries which 
have crossed over to a high density of mobile access between 2000-2008 have 
also lost trade ties, which may simply reflect the fact that the countries which 
have crossed this threshold between 2004 and 2008 were fairly different in their 
trade profiles to those that were above the threshold prior to 2004. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
We have examined the effects of digital access on the prevalence of democracy 
and its diffusion via trade/geographical networks across 152 countries between 
2000 and 2008.  Our panel data analysis uncovers a consistent positive 
relationship between civil liberties and digital access, and suggests that mobile 
access may also increase the extent to which a country to democratic changes in 
neighboring nations. Investigation of this relationship further using a dynamic 
actor-oriented model of the co-evolution of digital access, measures of democracy 
and trade tie formation suggests that mobile access has a stronger positive intra-
country effect on civil liberties than Internet access, which may in fact have a 
negative effect on democracy. Our analysis is based on a publicly available data 
and uses state-of-the-art empirical econometric and network analysis methods. To 
our knowledge, our work represents the first attempt to simultaneously examine 
changes in digital access and the evolution of different measures of democracy 
while admitting the possibility of inter-country spillovers and trade partner 
selection effects.   
While trade flows and geography appear to be the best available proxies at this 
time, it would be useful for future studies to have richer data about the inter-
country linkages that capture the diffusion of information and ideology more 
precisely.  Also, while we control for a number of country-specific factors, studies 
like ours would benefit from variables that capture variation in socio-political 
structure and history. As Haykel (2011) points out, these may be important 
determinants of the susceptibility of a country to the regional diffusion of 
democratizing revolutions.  
We have entered an era in which new generations of socially and economically 
important technologies like mobile computing devices, social media and location-
based software get created for and refined by consumers rather than by large 
enterprises, a trend often referred to as the consumerization of information 
technologies (Bapna et al., 2011). This contrasts the “business first” historical 
pattern of evolution of hardware (from mainframes to minicomputers to PCs) and 
software (from accounting information systems to enterprise resource planning 
systems and spreadsheets) and their associated transformative impacts on business 
(Dhar and Sundararajan, 2007).  The consumerization of IT is not just about a 
change in the target market for new technologies; it represents a fundamental 
paradigm shift which gives distributed people new capabilities for human 
endeavor and freedom, and may lead to information technologies fulfilling their 
true potential for societal and national transformation. The dominance of the 
democratizing effects of mobile access over traditional Internet access is 
especially encouraging in this regard, given that this is the device that is at the 
forefront of the consumerization of IT, and which will be the conduit for digital 
access for a vast majority of new Internet users over the coming decades.  
The impact of digital access on freedom and its diffusion is still in its infancy. The 
longer-run effect of having a technologically connected world on basic civil 
liberties and political rights will unfold over the coming decades. Our analysis 
provides a first empirical step towards uncovering what this impact might look 
like. We look forward to participating in and analyzing the continued 
democratizing effects of information and communications technologies.  
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